Abstract ：
Using a simple lifecycle model in which individuals are altruistic toward both their children and parents, we analyze decisions related to marriage, fertility, and elderly care provision for parents in a cooperative family Nash-bargaining model. Then, considering child-rearing subsidies and family elderly care subsidies, we analyze the policy effects of child-rearing and elderly care provision subsidies on marriage, fertility, and elderly care provision. The main findings are the following. Child-rearing subsidies increase the fertility rate. Elderly care subsidies always increase women’s care provision. If the net utility sum from elderly care provision for their two pairs of parents and from having children is positive, then couples might form. Child-rearing subsidies discourage young people from marrying. Elderly care subsidies do not always encourage young people to marry. With a positive correlation between marriage and fertility, these subsidies might function to lower fertility. If individuals do not adequately evaluate elderly care for parents, then the subsidy policy will lower the fertility rate.

Keywords: child rearing subsidy, elderly care for parents, elderly care provision subsidy, fertility, marriage
JEL Classification: H24, I19, J12, J13, J18